In this paper, we hypothesize that the strength of the consensus effect, i.e., the tendency for people to overweight the prevalence of their own values and preferences when forming beliefs about others’ values and preferences, depends on the salience of own preferences. We manipulate salience by varying the order of elicitation of preferences and beliefs. Although our results confirm the existence of the consensus effect, we find no evidence of a difference between the two orders of elicitation. While our results highlight the robustness of the consensus effect, they also indicate that salience does not mediate the strength of this phenomenon.

中文翻译：

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关于自己偏好的显着性和共识效应的注释

在本文中，我们假设共识效应的强度，即人们在形成对他人价值观和偏好的信念时，倾向于过度重视自己价值观和偏好的普遍性，取决于自己偏好的显着性。我们通过改变偏好和信念的引出顺序来操纵显着性。尽管我们的结果证实了共识效应的存在，但我们没有发现两种启发顺序之间存在差异的证据。虽然我们的结果突出了共识效应的稳健性，但它们也表明显着性不会调节这种现象的强度。