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What is philosophical progress? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-05-10 Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing, Insa Lawler, James Norton
What is it for philosophy to make progress? While various putative forms of philosophical progress have been explored in some depth, this overarching question is rarely addressed explicitly, perhaps because it has been assumed to be intractable or unlikely to have a single, unified answer. In this paper, we aim to show that the question is tractable, that it does admit of a single, unified answer,
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Why prevent human extinction? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-05-02 James Fanciullo
Many of us think human extinction would be a very bad thing, and that we have moral reasons to prevent it. But there is disagreement over what would make extinction so bad, and thus over what grounds these moral reasons. Recently, several theorists have argued that our reasons to prevent extinction stem not just from the value of the welfare of future lives, but also from certain additional values
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Internalizing rules Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-27 Spencer Paulson
The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process
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Marcus on self‐conscious knowledge of belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 James R. Shaw
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Marcus on forms of judgment and the theoretical orientation of the mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Lucy Campbell
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Some challenges raised by unconscious belief Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Adam Leite
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Precis of belief, inference, and the self‐conscious mind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-18 Eric Marcus
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Regions, extensions, distances, diameters Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-09 Claudio Calosi
Extended simple regions have been the focus of recent developments in philosophical logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of physics. However, only a handful of works provides a rigorous characterization of an extended simple region. In particular, a recent paper in this journal defends a definition based on an extrinsic notion of least distance. Call it the Least Distance proposal. This paper provides
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Probability discounting and money pumps Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-05 Petra Kosonen
In response to cases that involve tiny probabilities of huge payoffs, some argue that we ought to discount small probabilities down to zero. However, this paper shows that doing so violates Independence and Continuity, and as a result of these violations, those who discount small probabilities can be exploited by money pumps. Various possible ways of avoiding exploitation will be discussed. This paper
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Parity and Pareto Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Brian Hedden
Pareto principles are at the core of ethics and decision theory. The Strong Pareto principle says that if one thing is better than another for someone and at least as good for everyone else, then the one is overall better than the other. But a host of famous figures express it differently, with ‘not worse’ in place of ‘at least as good.’ In the presence of parity (or incommensurability), this results
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Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard's direct doxastic voluntarism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-04-02 Z Quanbeck
According to a traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, he endorses a strong form of direct doxastic voluntarism on which we can, by brute force of will, make a “leap of faith” to believe propositions that we ourselves take to be improbable and absurd. Yet most leading Kierkegaard scholars now wholly reject this reading, instead interpreting Kierkegaard as holding that the will can affect what we
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Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-03-28 Berit “Brit” Brogaard
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Episodic imagining, temporal experience, and beliefs about time Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-03-27 Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Shira Yechimovitz
We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these
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Leibniz as a virtue ethicist Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-03-26 Hao Dong
In this paper I argue that Leibniz's ethics is a kind of virtue ethics where virtues of the agent are explanatorily primary. I first examine how Leibniz obtained his conception of justice as a kind of love in an early text, Elements of Natural Law. I show that in this text Leibniz's goal was to find a satisfactory definition of justice that could reconcile egoism with altruism, and that this was achieved
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The new evil demon problem at 40 Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-03-11 Peter J. Graham
1 THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM I shall use ‘epistemic warrant’ and ‘epistemic justification’ interchangeably for a normative property that provides a good route to true belief and knowledge.1 Here are two facts: FACT ONE: Beliefs based on taking perceptual experiences at face value are defeasibly epistemically warranted. FACT TWO: Defeasibly taking perceptual experience at face value is a reliable route
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Knowledge‐by‐Acquaintance First Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-02-27 Uriah Kriegel
Bertrand Russell's epistemology had the interesting structural feature that it made propositional knowledge (“S knows that p”) asymmetrically dependent upon what Russell called knowledge by acquaintance. On this view, a subject lacking any knowledge by acquaintance would be unable to know that p for any p. This is something that virtually nobody has defended since Russell, and in this paper I initiate
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Causal modeling in multilevel settings: A new proposal Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-02-06 Thomas Blanchard, Andreas Hüttemann
An important question for the causal modeling approach is how to integrate non-causal dependence relations such as asymmetric supervenience into the approach. The most prominent proposal to that effect (due to Gebharter) is to treat those dependence relationships as formally analogous to causal relationships. We argue that this proposal neglects some crucial differences between causal and non-causal
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Commonsense morality and contact with value Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-01-29 Adam Lovett, Stefan Riedener
There seem to be many kinds of moral duties. We should keep our promises; we should pay our debts of gratitude; we should compensate those we've wronged; we should avoid doing or intending harm; we should help those in need. These constitute, some worry, an unconnected heap of duties: the realm of commonsense morality is a disorganized mess. In this paper, we outline a strategy for unifying commonsense
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Autonomy and aesthetic valuing Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2024-01-22 Nick Riggle
Accounts of aesthetic valuing emphasize two constraints on the formation of aesthetic belief. We must form our own aesthetic beliefs by engaging with aesthetic value first-hand (the acquaintance principle) and by using our own capacities (the autonomy principle). But why? C. Thi Nguyen's proposal is that aesthetic valuing has an inverted structure. We often care about inquiry and engagement for the
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Abstraction and grounding Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-12-29 Louis deRosset, Øystein Linnebo
The idea that some objects are metaphysically “cheap” has wide appeal. An influential version of the idea builds on abstractionist views in the philosophy of mathematics, on which numbers and other mathematical objects are abstracted from other phenomena. For example, Hume's Principle states that two collections have the same number just in case they are equinumerous, in the sense that they can be
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On behalf of the moral realist Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-12-25 Gideon Rosen
The overarching thesis of Clark-Doane's gripping book (Clarke-Doane, 2020) is that despite the many deep similarities between the views, realism about mathematics is a tenable position whereas moral realism is not. The closing chapters develop two main arguments for this thesis. The Argument from Safety (as I'll call it) wields a general epistemological principle to argue that moral realism leads to
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Realism, disagreement, and explanation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-12-25 Brian Leiter
Morality and Mathematics by Justin Clarke-Doane (2020; hereafter “JCD”) is a richly argued and deeply original contribution to meta-ethics. My focus will be primarily on the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3, purporting to show that moral beliefs and mathematical beliefs are actually on a par when it comes to both a priori and a posteriori justification (what I will call the “Symmetry Thesis”).1 I start
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Inquiry beyond knowledge Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-12-08 Bob Beddor
Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at
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The unity of knowledge Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-11-07 John Hyman
1 INTRODUCTION Intellectualists, in one sense of the term, hold that knowing how to do something (knowing how) is reducible to knowing that something is the case (knowing that), while their opponents deny this. Intellectualists therefore believe in the unity of knowledge—at least where these two forms of knowledge are concerned—whereas anti-intellectualists generally believe that there are at least
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The Geach-Kaplan sentence reconsidered Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-31 Kentaro Fujimoto
The Geach-Kaplan sentence is alleged to be an example of a non-first-orderizable sentence, and the proof of the alleged non-first-orderizability is credited to David Kaplan. However, there is also a widely shared intuition that the Geach-Kaplan sentence is still first-orderizable by invoking sets or other extra non-logical resources. The plausibility of this intuition is particularly crucial for first-orderism
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Why Mary left her room Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-27 Michaela M. McSweeney
I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher-order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping-by-fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather
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Causal decision theory, context, and determinism Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-19 Calum McNamara
The classic formulation of causal decision theory (CDT) appeals to counterfactuals. It says that you should aim to choose an option that would have a good outcome, were you to choose it. However, this version of CDT faces trouble if the laws of nature are deterministic. After all, the standard theory of counterfactuals says that, if the laws are deterministic, then if anything—including the choice
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Moral knowledge precis Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-11 Sarah McGrath
1 PRECIS Moral Knowledge addresses, and argues for answers to, a wide range of questions within moral epistemology, including questions about the sources of moral knowledge, the strengths and weaknesses of the method of reflective equilibrium as an answer to the question of where moral knowledge and justification come from, questions about moral testimony and moral expertise, and questions about the
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Embracing self-defeat in normative theory Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-12 Samuel Fullhart
Some normative theories are self-defeating. They tell us to respond to our situations in ways that bring about outcomes that are bad, given the aims of the theories, and which could have been avoided. Across a wide range of debates in ethics, decision theory, political philosophy, and formal epistemology, many philosophers treat the fact that a normative theory is self-defeating as sufficient grounds
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Practical wisdom as conviction in Aristotle's ethics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-10-12 Patricia Marechal
This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronēsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends . For
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How to be minimalist about shared agency Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-09-27 Jules Salomone-Sehr
What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two
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Standing up for supervenience Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-09-25 Bart Streumer
There is a well-known argument against irreducibly normative properties that appeals to the following claim about supervenience: for all possible worlds W and W*, if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative properties in W and W* is also exactly the same. This claim used to be uncontroversial, but recently several philosophers
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Making sense of things: Moral inquiry as hermeneutical inquiry Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-09-20 Paulina Sliwa
We are frequently confronted with moral situations that are unsettling, confusing, disorienting. We try to come to grips with them. When we do so, we engage in a distinctive type of moral inquiry: hermeneutical inquiry. Its aim is to make sense of our situation. What is it to make sense of one's situation? Hermeneutical inquiry is part of our everyday moral experience. Understanding its nature and
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Is truth inconsistent? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-09-05 Patrick Greenough
A popular and enduring approach to the liar paradox takes the concept of truth to be inconsistent. Very roughly, truth is an inconsistent concept if the central principles of this concept (taken together) entail a contradiction, where one of these central principles is Tarski's T-schema for truth: a sentence S is true if and only if p, (where S says that p). This article targets a version of Inconsistentism
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Will intelligent machines become moral patients? Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-09-09 Parisa Moosavi
This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency:
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The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-29 Lu Teng
Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging
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On the diverse priorities of autonomous women Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-23 Asha Bhandary
In Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor, Gina Schouten argues that political liberalism can support remedies to the gendered division of labor (henceforth GDL). Schouten defends policy proposals designed to incentivize men's uptake of caregiving responsibility in order to move us beyond the stalled revolution in gender equality, wherein gendered norms endorse and support the perpetuation
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Arguments philosophical and political Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-23 Anthony Simon Laden
Gina Schouten's book is full of nuanced, original arguments, sensitive to the difficulties of the issues involved, and fueled by a set of attractive commitments. Her attention to the persistent injustice constituted by the gendered division of labor is welcome, and her final take-away point—that the persistence of such division is a matter not merely of justice but of legitimacy—is important and, I
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Fair equality of opportunity and the gendered division of labor Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-23 Jonathan Quong
I learned a lot from Gina Schouten's excellent book, Liberalism, Neutrality, and the Gendered Division of Labor.1 Like Schouten, I'm a political liberal. I thus share her conviction that an account of what's unjust or illegitimate about the gendered division of labor (GDL) should satisfy the constraint of liberal neutrality; it should be grounded in political values that are acceptable as such to all
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Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-16 Benjamin Lange, Joshua Brandt
We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently;
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The Dworkin–Williams debate: Liberty, conceptual integrity, and tragic conflict in politics Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-08-12 Matthieu Queloz
Bernard Williams articulated his later political philosophy notably in response to Ronald Dworkin, who, striving for coherence or integrity among our political concepts, sought to immunize the concepts of liberty and equality against conflict. Williams, doubtful that we either could or should eliminate the conflict, resisted the pursuit of conceptual integrity. Here, I reconstruct this Dworkin–Williams
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Two kinds of curiosity Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-07-20 Daniela Dover
Leading philosophical models of curiosity represent it as a desiderative attitude whose content is a question, and which is satisfied by knowledge of the answer to that question. I argue that these models do not capture the distinctive character of a form of curiosity that I call 'erotic curiosity'. Erotic curiosity addresses itself not to a question but to an object whose significance for the inquirer
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In defense of guilt-tripping Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-07-19 Rachel Achs
It is tempting to hold that guilt-tripping is morally wrong, either because it is objectionably manipulative, or because it involves gratuitously aiming to make another person suffer, or both. In this article, I develop a picture of guilt according to which guilt is a type of pain that incorporates a commitment to its own justification on the basis of the subject's wrongdoing. This picture supports
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Regulative rules: A distinctive normative kind Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-07-02 Indrek Reiland
What are rules? In this paper I develop a view of regulative rules which takes them to be a distinctive normative kind occupying a middle ground between orders and normative truths. The paradigmatic cases of regulative rules that I'm interested in are social rules like rules of etiquette and legal rules like traffic rules. On the view I'll propose, a rule is a general normative content that is in force
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Pessimism and procreation Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-29 Daniel Pallies
The pessimistic hypothesis is the hypothesis that life is bad for us, in the sense that we are worse off for having come into existence. Suppose this hypothesis turns out to be correct — existence turns out to be more of a burden than a gift. A natural next thought is that we should stop having children. But I contend that this is a mistake; procreation would often be permissible even if the pessimistic
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De Se Names Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-21 Maite Ezcurdia, Carla Merino-Rajme
We argue that there are names with de se contents and that they are theoretically fruitful. De se names serve to challenge intuitive and otherwise plausible orthodoxies such as Stalnaker's view of communication and Bayesian views of belief update. These implications are also significant for those already sympathetic to the irreducibility of de se content.
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Rational risk-aversion: Good things come to those who weight Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-19 Christopher Bottomley, Timothy Luke Williamson
No existing normative decision theory adequately handles risk. Expected Utility Theory is overly restrictive in prohibiting a range of reasonable preferences. And theories designed to accommodate such preferences (for example, Buchak's (2013) Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory) violate the Betweenness axiom, which requires that you are indifferent to randomizing over two options between which you
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Charitable matching and moral credit Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-18 Daniel Nolan
When charitable matching occurs, both the person initially offering the matching donation and the person taking up the offer may well feel they have done something better than if they had donated on their own without matching. They may well feel they deserve some credit for the matched donation as well as their own. Can they both be right? Natural assumptions about charitable matching lead to puzzles
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Overbooking: Permissible when and only when scaled up Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-18 Roy Sorensen
Bumped from a flight? Relax with this defense of the big business practice of deliberately promising more services than one will provide. On a small scale, over-promising yields a toxic moral dilemma and a lie. At a large scale, the dilemma becomes dilute, and the lie completely disappears. Overbooking is honest because there is a sufficiently high probability of fulfilling each promise. Overbooking
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Faith and rational deference to authority Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-10 Lara Buchak
Many accounts of faith hold that faith is deference to an authority about what to believe or what to do. I show that this kind of faith fits into a more general account of faith, the risky-commitment account. I further argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority even when the authority's pronouncement goes against one's own reasoning. Indeed, such deference is rational in typical cases in
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Moral Worth and Skillful Action Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-10 David Horst
Someone acts in a morally worthy way when they deserve credit for doing the morally right thing. But when and why do agents deserve credit for the success involved in doing the right thing? It is tempting to seek an answer to that question by drawing an analogy with creditworthy success in other domains of human agency, especially in sports, arts, and crafts. Accordingly, some authors have recently
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Beliefs as dispositions to make judgments Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-07 Anna-Sara Malmgren
I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to comment on Declan Smithies’ thought-provoking, creative, and ambitious book: The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (‘ERC’).1 Unfortunately I can only discuss a small selection of the issues that it covers here. I'll focus on the conception of belief that Smithies defends in Ch. 4–5 (and further in Ch. 7–10): beliefs as dispositions to cause judgments—specifically
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Replies to Feldman, Greco, and Malmgren Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-07 Declan Smithies
In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness, I defend phenomenal accessibilism, which is a version of evidentialism that combines phenomenalism about evidence with accessibilism about the evidential support relation. My critics in this symposium challenge phenomenal accessibilism from various angles. Richard Feldman accepts phenomenalism, although he rejects my version of accessibilism. In contrast, Daniel
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The epistemic role of consciousness Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-06-07 Declan Smithies
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Smithies 2019) develops a theory of epistemic justification that gives a fundamental epistemic role to phenomenal consciousness. The book works from the bottom up to build this epistemological theory from foundational assumptions in the philosophy of mind. This précis reverses the order of presentation: it works from the top down to put the epistemological motivations
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Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride Philos. Phenomenol. Res. Pub Date : 2023-05-29 Charles Goldhaber
Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these